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COURT REPORTS
UNITED STATES FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Bravos v. EPA, 2004 WL 390799 (D.D.C. 2004)
In Bravos v. EPA, the main issue was whether or not the EPA's approval of a New Mexico's TMDLs for
a small mountain stream, which also included an implementation plan to attain those TMDLs, was a final
agency action regarding the implementation plan, within the meaning of Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
2004 WL 390799 (D.D.C.).
The origins of case began when a developer built a ski resort called Ski Rio in the valley along the
creek's drainage. Id. at *3. The construction began to pollute the creek and suit was brought by citizens to
compel the EPA to take action and improve the quality of the creek's water. Id. See Forest Guardians v.
Browner, Civil Action No. 96-0826. The result of this action was a consent decree and settlement agreement
establishing ten-year TMDL schedule with New Mexico. Id. The New Mexico Environmental Department
(NMED) adopted TMDLs for the three pollutants at issue and submitted these TMDLs to the EPA in
accordance with Section 303(d) of Clean Water Act (CWA) for approval. Id. at **4-5. Within this TMDL
document, the state also included an implementation plan outlining the steps it would take to reach the TMDLs
in the allotted time period. Id. at *5.
The EPA approved these suggested TMDLs in a letter to the NMED. Id. In this letter there was a
section entitled "Implementation Plans." Id. This section explicitly stated that "although implementation plans
are not approved by the EPA, they help to establish the basis for EPA's approval of TMDLs." Id. The section
also said that the NMED had included a "generic" implementation plan within its TMDL and that "reasonable
assurances that load reductions will be achieved are not required in order for a TMDL to be approvable." Id.
In response to the defendant EPA's defense that there was no final agency action, and therefore the
claim was not ripe, the plaintiff argued that in approving the TMDLs, the EPA had also approved the
implementation plan of the NMED. Id. at *6.
To be considered final, an agency action must mark the consummation of the agency's decision making
process and the action must be one from which legal consequences may flow. Id. at *7. The court will look
primarily to whether agency "action is 'definitive' and whether it has a 'direct and immediate . . . effect on the
day-to-day business' of the part[y] challenging the action." Id.
The plaintiff in the instant case was attempting to challenge the EPA's approval of the state
implementation plan, not the TMDLs. Id The court plainly stated that the EPA's letter did not make any
definitive findings regarding the implementation plan, but merely commented that the TMDL plan included a
"generic" implementation plan. It then stated that the EPA's approval of the TMDLs "does not translate into
approval of the . . . implementation plan." Id. Furthermore, the court stated that there is no statutory language
requiring the a state to submit or thee EPA to approve implementation plans. Id. at *8.
As such, the court held that there was no final agency action since the "EPA's correspondence in no way
either approved or disapproved . . . [New Mexico's] implementation plan." Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs claim
was dismissed as the court lacked jurisdiction under the APA to review the action. Id.
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ARC Ecology v. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22005 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
In a December 3, 2003 decision, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Jose Division sought to determine if the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9604 et seq. (2000), applied to claims brought by citizens of a foreign
country against the U.S. to determine alleged pollution on former U.S. military bases located in a foreign
country.
In Arc Ecology, the Plaintiffs were Filipino citizens who lived or traveled around property which
formerly held U.S. military bases. Individual citizens were joined by Arc Ecology and the Filipino-American
Coalition for Environmental Solutions, two non-profit organizations supporting those seeking cleanup of former
U.S. military bases in the Philippines. The Plaintiffs wanted to compel the defendants, the United States
Department of the Air Force, the United States Department of the Navy, the United States Department of
Defense, and Donald Rumsfeld in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, (1) to conduct preliminary assessments
of two former bases, and (2) to obtain an order declaring the CERCLA provisions applied to the two bases. The
Defendants sought to have the suit dismissed because the Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.
Although the District Court found that it had standing and subject matter jurisdiction, it dismissed the
claim because Plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. (The Court did not reach the
Defendants' improper venue argument.)
The District Court noted that although CERCLA created the "Superfund" to allow the federal
government to respond to hazardous waste disposal, CERCLA's legislative history is focused domestically.
Absent contrary intent, Congressional legislation is meant to apply only to the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. This "presumption against extraterritoriality" prevents clashes between our laws and those of
foreign nations, and reflects the idea that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions when it
legislates. The Philippines is an independent, sovereign nation, not a "territory or possession" over which the
United States has jurisdiction.
Since the primary relief sought by the Plaintiffs was preliminary assessments of the two bases as called
for by Section 105(d) of CERCLA, and since 105(d) applies only to releases or threatened releases in the United
States and not foreign nations, the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the
District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Therefore, CERCLA does not apply extraterritorially to
properties located within another sovereign nation.
NATHAN

A. STEIMEL

Green Atlas Shipping S.A. v. U.S., 2003 WL 23314452 (D. Or. 2003)
In Green Atlas Shipping S.A. v. US, a District Court held that a captain of a ship was not an "operator"
of the vessel within meaning of Oil Pollution Act (OPA). There were numerous claims and counterclaims
arising from the February 4, 1999 grounding of the MN NEW CARISSA near Coos Bay, Oregon. Oil spilled
into the environment in harmful quantities after the vessel broke into pieces. The plaintiffs allege the U.S. was
negligent by designating the area where the ship was anchored as a suitable winter months anchorage on the
applicable nautical chart and Coast Pilot publication and sought $96 million. The U.S. asserted various
counterclaims seeking compensation for pollution removal costs along with other costs associated with the spill
under the Oil Pollution Act, general maritime law of negligence, and the Rivers and Harbors Act.
The U.S. also brought a complaint against Benjamin Morgado, the master of the NEW CARISSA. After
dealing briefly with the other causes of action, the court focused on the third party action against Captain
Morgado's Motion for Summary Judgment on the United States' OPA Claims. Captain Morgado argued that he
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could not be a "responsible party" under OPA since he was not an "operator" of the NEW CARISSA.
"responsible party" is defined under the OPA as "[i]n the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or
demise chartering the vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32) (2000). While "owner or operator" is "in the case of a
vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, the vessel . . . " 33 U.S.C. § 2701(26). Congress
enacted the OPA to compensate victims of oil spills as well as provide quick clean up to minimize damage to
the environment. Under OPA, each responsible party of a vessel is liable for removal costs and damages. See
33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
Captain Morgado argued that OPA requires responsible parties to establish and maintain financial
responsibility sufficient to meet the maximum possible liability under the statute. See 33 U.S.C. § 2716(a). The
Captain argued that since this amount would be $22 million for the NEW CARISSA, it could not have been
Congress's intent that he (Captain Morgado) would personally have financial assurance of $22 million. The
captain also cited regulations put out by the Secretary of Transportation regarding financial responsibility
requirements. The judge agreed with this financial responsibility argument, saying that he was "persuaded by
Captain Morgado's arguments because the financial responsibility requirements in the statute indicate that
Congress had a narrow view of which entities would be responsible parties in the context of a vessel, and
because, likewise, the agency charged with implementing the statute did not appear to have interpreted
Congress' intent as casting the OPA's liability net over vessel captains."
Captain Morgado also cited the "historical meaning of operator in the maritime context is the entity that
controls the vessel and its captain and crew, not the captain himself." The government did not respond directly
to this argument, it primarily relied on the word "person" in the statute and said that under the plain meaning of
the OPA, "responsible parties" includes "[i]n the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or demise
chartering the vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32). Thus, Captain Morgado is a person, and he literally operated the
NEW CARISSA as its captain.
The court declined to interpret the OPA analogously to previous decisions based on similar provision in
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, and held that Congress did not
intend to significantly vary "the general maritime understanding of operators as those entities that are ultimately
responsible for the vessel's overall operation, including the direction of the captain and crew, abut not the
captain himself." Therefore, Captain Morgado was not the Operator of the NEW CARISSA under the OPA and
his motion for partial summary judgment was granted.
NATHAN

A. STEIMEL

U.S. v. Earp, 2003 WL 23220083 (D.S.C. 2003)
Defendant George Earp owns and operates two seafood distribution companies in North Carolina. Mr.
Earp was caught selling white bass to a seafood store in South Carolina in violation of a ban on the sale of white
bass in South Carolina.
The United States filed a criminal information charging Mr. Earp (and his businesses) with violating the
Lacy Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2000), which makes it a misdemeanor to import, export, or sell in interstate
commerce any fish in violation of state law. In this case, South Carolina has a statute making it illegal to sell
white bass in the state, which then triggered the Lacy Act when Mr. Earp sold his white bass in interstate
commerce.
Mr. Earp moved to dismiss on the grounds that the South Carolina Statute violated the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. The State of South Carolina then moved to intervene in the case in
order to protect its own interests as to the constitutionality of the statute. United States Magistrate Judge
Bristow Marchant granted the motion to intervene. Ultimately, the Magistrate dismissed the charges against
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Mr. Earp and his businesses; finding that the state statute banning the sale of white bass in South Carolina did in
fact violate the Commerce Clause. The state and federal government appealed.
There was an initial argument over the appropriate standard of review to be applied in the case. The
government wanted a de novo review, while Mr. Earp wanted the "clearly erroneous" standard to apply.
Ultimately, the court of appeals held that the de novo standard would apply to the Magistrate Judge's legal
determinations, while the "clearly erroneous" standard would apply to the Magistrate Judge's factual
determinations.
In examining Commerce Clause cases, a court's first inquiry must be to the nature of the alleged
violation. That is, the court must determine whether the statute in question affirmatively discriminates against
interstate commerce or merely indirectly or incidentally burdens such transactions. This determination shifts,
and increases, the burden of proof. If the statute indirectly burdens interstate commerce, it is only a violation if
the burdens it imposes are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefit. If the statute affirmatively
discriminates against interstate commerce, the burden is on the government to show both that the statute serves
a legitimate local purpose, and that this purpose could not be achieved equally as well by other, less
discriminatory means. The District Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge's determination that the statute in
question only indirectly discriminates against interstate commerce. That is, the statute is uniform because it
imposes a blanket ban on the sale of white bass regardless of where the fish were originally caught or
purchased.
Continuing with the requisite analysis for indirect violations, Mr. Earp does not contest that the statute
serves a legitimate local purpose in attempting to preserve the state's population of white bass. Mr. Earp does,
however, argue that there are other less discriminatory means of accomplishing this goal. Mr. Earp argues that
a ban only on the sale of native white bass would be just as effective as the current ban on the sale of any white
bass. The Magistrate Judge agreed that this would be equally effective and less discriminatory. The
government makes arguments in support of the total ban, but none adequately explain the necessity for such a
total ban. The District Court held that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the Magistrate Judge's
conclusion was clearly erroneous. Therefore, the District Court ultimately agreed with the Magistrate Judge's
determination that there were in fact available less discriminatory means of preserving South Carolina's white
bass population. The Magistrate Judge's dismissal on Constitutional Commerce Clause grounds was affirmed.
CONTRIBUTORS: ANDREW

J. ENNIs,

R. MARISSA ALBERT & JEFFREY S. LUECHTEFELD
UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

No Spray Coalition. Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2003)
In July of 2000, a group of individuals and environmental groups sought to enjoin the city of New York
from spraying pesticides. To do so, the group filed a citizen's enforcement suit under the Clean Water Act
("CWA") in district court in New York. Plaintiffs alleged that the City had used the pesticides to kill
mosquitoes in an attempt to combat the spread of West Nile virus without first obtaining the necessary permit as
mandated by the CWA. The statute prohibits "discharge" of "any pollutant" into "navigable waters" without a
permit issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") or under a federally approved state permit system ("SPDES").
The City admitted that it did not obtain the permit, but claimed its spraying was in compliance with the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), which is a regulatory statute that controls the
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use and marketing of certain chemicals. The statute requires that such chemicals are used in accordance with
the instructions on the label.
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in November of 2003, ruling that
New York's use of the insecticides did substantially comply with the requirements of the FIFRA. The court did
so because of its determination that "Congress intended FIFRA as the primary scheme governing pesticide use."
The court reasoned that because FIFRA precludes enforcement by citizen suits, the Plaintiffs case could not go
forward, despite the fact that the CWA does provide for such a remedy.
In December of 2003, the appellate court rebuked the district court's statutory interpretation and found
that the district court's ruling "impermissibly modified" the CWA, which expressly permits enforcement by a
citizen suit. The court said that it saw no reason to, "eliminate from CWA a remedy which it expressly
provides" merely because the remedy is not provided for by FIFRA. The court therefore vacated the district
court's decision and remanded the case.
CLARE N. MURPHY
Raymond Proffitt Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 343 F.3d 199 (3rd Cir. 2003).
In August of 1999, the Raymond Proffitt Foundation (the "Foundation") filed a twelve count complaint
concerning the water control management for the Lehigh River at the Francis E. Walter Dam ("Walter Dam")
against the Army Corps of Engineers.
Count one asserted that the Corps was unlawfully withholding or delaying agency action required by §
306 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1990 (WRDA). The Foundation disagreed with the Corps
policy of matching the outflow of water from Walter Dam with its inflow, believing the WRDA required the
Corps to use differing outflows of water during the year.
The District Court granted summary judgment to the Corps on all of the Foundation's claims. On the
only count appealed, the court held that the "Corps' actions under the WRDA were unreviewable because the
WRDA did not provide any 'law to apply' to this situation." The court reasoned that the WRDA gives a
general environmental protection mission to the Corps, but leaves the Corps with discretion on how to apply
this mission to specific water resource projects. Since the WRDA only provides a general statement
establishing environmental protection as one of the Corps primary missions, but gives no guidance on how to
carry out this mission, the District Court reasoned that the WRDA fit within the exception from reviewability.
The Appellate Court affirmed, reasoning that there was nothing discretionary in the WRDA's command
that environmental protection should be a primary mission of the Corps and the District Court erred when it
concluded that there was no "law to apply." Holding that Congress vested broad discretion in the Corps and the
"deferential review that discretion requires of the judiciary," the District Court decision was affirmed when the
Corps was able to show that it had made environmental protection one of its primary missions.
The Appellate Court first found that the District Court erred in applying § 701(a)(2) of the APA because
the WRDA does not contain "law to apply." The agency discretion exception to judicial review is only
applicable when a statute is written in terms so broad that there is no law to apply. The court came to the
conclusion that even if the Corps had very broad discretion in its policy, that this is not the same as
unreviewable discretion and thus the "allegations are amenable to judicial review."
While the Appellate Court disagreed with the District Court's decision of reviewability, it agreed with
the District Court's finding that there is enough evidence of the Corp's implementation of§ 306 of
the WRDA,
at least minimally, to satisfy the minimum amount of action required under the APA. The court came to this
conclusion because the environment is just one of the primary missions of the Corps and it is up to the
discretion of the Corps to decide what amount of environmental protection is appropriate in a given situation.
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While the court is competent to determine if an agency has over-stepped its discretion, their scope of-review of
the agency is limited because Congress gave the Corps such broad discretion in its actions.
ELFIN NOCE

In re Needham, 2003 WL 22953383 (5th Cir. 2003)
The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 was intended to streamline federal law and enhance the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) ability to prevent and respond to catastrophic oil spills in several
ways. For one, the OPA created the national Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to assist with cleanup costs when a
responsible party is unable or unwilling to clean up oil spills. The OPA imposes strict liability upon parties
responsible for discharging oil into "navigable waters." "Navigable waters" is defined in the statute to mean
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." The legislative history and the identical text
strongly indicate that Congress intended that the meaning of "navigable waters" was to be the same in both the
OPA the Clean Water Act.
An employee of Needham Resources, Inc., a company owned by the Needhams, pumped oil from an oil
containment well into an adjacent drainage ditch. The EPA and the Coast Guard assumed control of the
cleanup, an effort that was funded by the Oil Spill Liability Act. The United States Coast Guard sued the
Needhams for reimbursement of their clean up expenses pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). The
Needhams claimed that the oil spill was not regulated by the OPA because the spill did not implicate any
navigable waters that were subject to federal jurisdiction. The Needhams subsequently filed for bankruptcy.
The following day, the United States sued the Needhams and their company in federal bankruptcy court
to recoup its cleanup costs. At the bankruptcy hearing, both parties stipulated that the oil was originally
discharged into a drainage ditch, spilled into Bayou Cutoff, and then spilled into Bayou Folse. It is undisputed
that Bayou Folse flows directly into the Company Canal, an industrial waterway that eventually flows into the
Gulf of Mexico.
The bankruptcy court found that the spill was not subject to federal regulation. The court held that the
OPA had no jurisdiction to compel the Needhams to pay for the cleanup, stating that the drainage ditch and
Bayou Cutoff are not navigable waters and are not sufficiently adjacent to navigable waters as required in order
for the Act to control. The district court affirmed, finding no basis to disturb the ruling of the bankruptcy court.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found error with the bankruptcy court's two critical findings of fact.
The two findings of fact at issue are (1) that the oil spilled only into the ditch and the Bayou Cutoff and (2) that
neither the ditch nor Cutoff were navigable waters. The appellate court concluded that the oil spill did in fact
implicate navigable waters, triggering the OPA's federal regulatory jurisdiction. The bankruptcy court's
decision was reversed and remanded.
In appealing the bankruptcy court's decision, the United States challenged the court's conclusion that the
spilled oil did not contaminate waters regulated by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). Specifically, the United States
asserted that the oil was spilled into navigable-in-fact waters, or alternatively, into waters that were adjacent to
navigable waters. The court ultimately agreed with the latter of the two arguments and divided its opinion into
two parts: (1) defining the OPA's jurisdiction and (2) reviewing the bankruptcy court's findings of fact.
In reaching its decision, the court defined "navigable waters" narrowly, refusing to approve the broad
regulatory definition of "navigable waters" as defined by the Act, although other circuits had recently done so.
The 5th Circuit held that the United States was only permitted to regulate bodies of water that are actually
navigable or adjacent to navigable waters.
LORRAINE
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GDF Realty Investments, LTD v. Norton, 2004 WL 396975 (5th Cir. 2004)
On February 27, 2004, the Fifth Circuit denied a rehearing and rehearing en banc petition from GDF
Realty Investments, LTD of the circuit's 2003 decision favoring the government. In that decision, the court
held that the Endangered Species Act's ("ESA") "take" provision was not unconstitutional as applied to certain
species of Cave Bugs found in two Texas counties. GDF Really Investments, LTD v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624
(5th Cir. 2003). Rather the court concluded that because these takes could be aggregated with all other
endangered species takings it had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. In the 2004 ruling, Circuit
Judge Jones, joined by five other justices, dissented to the denials arguing that a rehearing en banc was
necessary in order to be faithful to the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions of Lopez and Morrison.
These Cave Bugs are found solely in limestone caves on a tract of land west of Austin, which
landowners-appellants wish to commercially develop. Despite their retention of required permits, landowners
were unable to build because the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services ("FWS") held that six species of the Cave
Bugs were endangered. Under the ESA, it is unlawful to 'take' a member of the endangered species. Take is
defined as to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or collect." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)
(2000). Federal regulations define harm broadly as "including significant modifications or degradations of a
habitat which kill or injure protected wildlife 'by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering."' GDF Really, 2004 WL 396975 at *2 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Following a suit by the landowners, the district court granted summary judgment to FWS finding the
regulated activity to be the planned commercial development. Then the court of appeals affirmed the decision,
but on other grounds. Judge Jones believes that although the court of appeals initially found the regulated
activity under the ESA was the Cave Bug takes, and not the landowners planned development, the panel
nonetheless incorrectly aggregated the Cave Bug takes with all takes of endangered species. The dissent argued
that the panel's decision undercuts Lopez and Morrison because although it found the Cave Bugs to be noneconomic in nature it still aggregated the Cave Bug "takings with all takes of all endangered species because (1)
they are part of a larger regulation that is directed at activity that is economic in nature and (2) the intrastate
activity [ ] is an essential part of the economic regulatory scheme." Id. at *5.
The dissent states that the panel offered little reasoning to support these notions. Instead, he insists the
panel should have followed Lopez and Morrison to avoid the long "but-for-causal chain" approach. Thus,
avoiding the finding that "the essential purpose of the ESA is to protect the ecosystems upon which we and
other species depend" and that every take is essential because all species are interrelated and the extinction of
one may lead to the extinction of all. Id. at *6. Moreover, Judge Jones contends that the panel's decision
ignored that federal legislation under the Commerce Clause must have a limiting principle to avoid a federalism
conflict. Finally, the dissent believes that the panel's holding that a 'link' between Cave Bug takes and a
substantial commercial effect is not attenuated, contradicts its own precedent of Commerce Clause decisions.
Although the dissent believes that while many ESA prohibited takings, which clearly effect commerciallyrelated activities may be constitutional, the notion that Cave Bugs, who have no tourism, scientific, or
agricultural purpose, can be regulated by the federal government by means of the Commerce Clause, "simply
goes to far." Id. at *7.
JESSICA HULTING

Le-Ax Water District v. City of Athens. Ohio. 346 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2003)
Within the Sixth Circuit, a rural water district ("RWD") may seek federal protection under 7 U.S.C. §
1926(b) (2000) from the -curtailment or encroachment" of a municipal water association if 1) the rural water

331

MELPR, Vol. 11, No. 3
district is an " 'association' within the meaning of the Act; 2) it has a qualifying outstanding FmHA loan
obligation; and 3) it has provided or made service available in the disputed area." Lex-Ax Water District, 346
F.3d at 705. In 2000, Le-Ax, a RWD in Ohio, filed suit against the City of Athens alleging that its proposed
arrangement with University Estates, a developer planning to place a golf-course community within a third of a
mile from Le-Ax's boundary, violated § 1926(b). After cross motions for summary judgment and a hearing, the
Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgement to Le-Ax issuing a declaratory judgment that the
proposed water supply arrangement between Athens and University Estates would violate § 1926(b). The City
of Athens followed with this timely appeal.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. Since no dispute existed between
the parties as to Le-Ax being an 'association', and its outstanding loans to FmHA's successor, the main issue at
hand was whether Le-Ax had "provided or made service available" to University Estates. Due to the lack of
explanation concerning this phrase from the statute, legislative history, Supreme Court, and Congress the court
reviewed the decisions of other federal circuits along with its own precedent. The Sixth Circuit, hold that a
RWD has "made service available" to a disputed area by having 1) the physical ability to do so and 2) a legal
right under state law. The court found that Le-Ax met both requirements. First, Le-Ax met the "pipes in
ground" test because it maintained an eight-inch water line immediately adjacent to the disputed area. This line
would be able to provide more than enough water to University Estates. Secondly, Le-Ax had a legal right to
serve University Estates under Ohio law, which allows a water district to supply water "within or without" its
district. See Oho Rev. Code Ann. §6119.01(A) (2003). This -established that Le-Ax had the right to supply
water outside its boundaries. Thus, Le-Ax had both the physical ability and the legal right to serve University
Estates, and were found to have "made service available" to the disputed area.
However, after reviewing the text and legislative history of § 1926(b), the court held that the
Congressional intent was simply to provide a "shield" against the curtailment and encroachment from
municipalities, and not provide a sword to RWDs to seek out new customers outside its boundaries. The court
found that all relevant case history supported this notion. Moreover, the court stated that by allowing Le-Ax to
take such an expansive view of § 1926(b), would allow it to gain a "monopoly status not only within its
boundaries ... but also would extend that status to wherever Le-Ax could provide service." Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the granting of summary judgment to Le-Ax and remanded the case to the district court to grant
judgment in favor of Athens.
Judge Gibbions dissenting opinion finds the majority decision inconsistent with the court's own
precedent concerning § 1926(b). Although he agrees that § 1926(b) was to be used as a shield rather than a
sword, he disagrees with the majority's definition of the Le-Ax's boundaries. Instead, of the state defined
political boundaries of Le-Ax, which the majority says is decisive, he believes that Le-Ax should be able to
defend its boundaries where it is able to supply service. As a result, he believes that the majority is creating a
new element to the § 1926(b) claim that has no basis in statute or precedent.
JESSICA HULTING

Center For Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Service, 349 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2003)
In 1990, the United States Forest Service created the Northern Goshawk Scientific Committee to review
the impact of logging practices on the habitat needs of the northern goshawk. In 1992 the Committee published
its report, and concluded that the northern goshawk was a habitat generalist occupying a mix of forest types.
The Forest Service used this information to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement to begin logging in
Southwestern Region. In response to this study, the Arizona Game and Fish Department (AGFD) produced
scientific evidence contradicting the Committee's study. The Forest Service included two options in its
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Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) based on the AGFD's findings, but did not include the study itself in the
statement. The Center for Biological Diversity sued the Forest Service claiming that the EIS was inadequate for
failing to disclose studies contradicting its findings. The question before the court was whether simply listing
alternatives that take into account opposing scientific evidence is enough to satisfy the requirements of the
National Environmental Protection Act, or whether the opposing data itself must be published.
The court focused on the agreement between the parties that the concerns raised by the Appellants
represented responsible opposing scientific viewpoints in regards to the northern goshawk being a habitat
generalist. The Forrest Service argued the final impact statement adequately addressed these concerns because
they included Alternative D, which was based entirely on the suggestions of the AGFD and the New Mexico
Department of Game and Fish (NMDGF). The court held that this was not adequate, and as such the Forest
Service failed to properly disclose and discuss all responsible opposing views. The court went on to say that
even though the AGFD's Review Paper was included in the final EIS, this was not enough to satisfy NEPA
requirements because the Forest Service redacted the final section of the paper, which contained the AFGD's
concerns. Finally, the court held that NEPA requires specific disclosure of opposing scientific data, not just a
general statement that some opposition exists.
JAMES C. CHOSTNER

County of Okanogan v. Natl. Marine Fisheries Service, 347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2003)
Permit holders representing the County of Okanogan filed an action against the National Marine
Fisheries Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and others seeking a declaratory judgment that the actions
of the federal defendants related to water ditch permits were unconstitutional and exceeded their authority.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants and the permit holders appealed.
The Skyline Irrigation Ditch and the Early Winters Ditch are the ditches at issue. "These ditches
traverse the Okanogan National Forest and divert water to plaintiffs for agricultural and other purposes." A
special use permit was granted in 1903 for the Skyline ditch and similarly for the Early Winter ditch in 1910
with a revocable and nontransferable restriction that may be terminated "at the discretion of the regional forester
or the Chief, Forest Service." Additionally, the two permits were renewed several times. The permits stated
that the permittees "shall comply with all the laws and regulations governing National Forests."
The United States Forest Service assessed these special use permits for the Chewuch River. The
assessments led the Forest Service to conclude that continued operation of a ditch was likely to adversely affect
the steelhead and chinook salmon. Under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), steelhead trout and salmon
were listed as endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (2000). The Forest Service also found that a second
ditch was likely to adversely affect the steelhead and chinook by "adversely affecting nesting and spawning
areas."
The permit holders do not argue that the federal agencies violated any aspects of the ESA. but that
compliance with the ESA was not authorized because such compliance would deny them their vested water
rights under state law. The court on appeal did not agree with the permit holders. "The more recent permits
expressly state that they do not convey water rights and are subject to amendment when, at the discretion of the
authorizing officer, such action is deemed necessary or desirable to incorporate new terms, conditions and
stipulations as may be required by law, regulation, land management plans, or other management decisions."
The ESA and regulations thereunder require federal agencies to consult with designated consulting agencies
whenever a federal action '"may affect" a threatened or endangered species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (2002).
Furthermore, the regulations provide that this consultation is required for all discretionary federal involvement,
"including the granting of permits or rights-of-way, pursuant to 50 C.F.R. § 402.02(c) (2002)." This court held
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that the "permits themselves, from their inception provided the government with unqualified discretion to
restrict or terminate the rights-of-way."
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 authorized respective federal authorities to grant
rights-of-way. Such rights of way, "shall contain ... terms and conditions which will . . . minimize damage

to...fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the environment." 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(1). The district
court upheld the language of this as well as other enabling statutes, and also noted that the permits were
revocable on their face. Ultimately, the defendants did not overreach their constitutional authority in restricting
the permits. This court agreed with the district' court that the placement of restriction on the right-of-way
permits was within the authority of the Forest Service. The Forest Service has authority to maintain certain
levels of flow in the rivers and streams within the boundaries of the Okanogan National Forest to protect
endangered fish species.
*
The court of appeals affirmed the district court decision.
DAVID RINGHOFER

Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Natl. Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F. 3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2003)
Sea turtles were once abundant off the shores of the United States. Today all six species of sea turtles
are listed as either endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act. The Ninth Circuit has taken a
significant step forward in protecting the remaining fragile populations of sea turtles. Turtle Island Restoration
Network, requires the National Marine Fisheries Service engage in the consultation process required by the
Endangered Species Act to determine if the issuance of longline fishing permits will likely jeopardize the
survival of the sea turtles.
The issue on appeal to the Ninth Circuit was whether the issuance of fishing permits as required by the
High Seas Fishing Compliance Act, requires the consultation process of the ESA. The court began its analysis
by answering the question of whether issuing fishing permits was an agency action that would implicate the
ESA. Agency action has been interpreted broadly, encompassing essentially any agency action funded in full or
in part by the Untied States. Relying on the broad interpretation that agency action has been given, the court
found that issuing fishing permits was an agency action that could trigger ESA.
After determining the threshold question of agency action, the court was left to determine if there was
sufficient discretion vested in the Fisheries Service to trigger Section 7 of the ESA. The test used by the instant
court was whether the agency has the ability to "inure to the benefit of the protected species."
The court relied on a combination of traditional statutory construction doctrines to come to this
conclusion. The court noted that "every clause and word of the statue" should be given effect and that the text
should be viewed in light of the whole structure and scheme of the statute. The Compliance Act states that the
Fisheries Service may condition the issuance of fishing permits and the lists two types of conditions that may be
used. Noting that traditionally the language "including but not limited to" indicated a non-exclusive list, the
court found that the language clearly indicated Congress' intent to instill in the Fisheries Service the ability to
condition fishing permits for reasons other than those listed. Because Congress' intention was clear and the
court must give effect to that intent, the court found that the National Marine Fisheries Service's interpretation
was not entitled to Chevron deference.
The court held that under the plain language of the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act, the National
Marine Fisheries Service had sufficient discretion to inure to the benefit of sea turtles. Thus, the court held that
because the National Marine Fisheries Service had discretion, the National Marine Fisheries Service was
required to engage in the consultation process to investigate the potential effects of the permits on the protected
species.
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On the heels of this decision, the U.S. Fisheries Service issued a new rule banning longline fishing for
swordfish off the shores of California. With the ban in place, the Ninth Circuit's requirement that Fisheries
Service engage in the consultation process is moot. However, this case is evidence of the extent to which the
protection of endangered species is a national priority, even at significant costs to industry.
ELIZABETH P. MCNICHOLS

STATE COURTS
N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Marisol, 845 A.2d 147 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004)
In Marisol, the appellate division of the Superior Court of New Jersey addressed whether the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection could impose monetary penalties on Marisol corporation, a
hazardous .waste treatment and storage site, for violations of the Solid Waste Management Act. The
Environmental Dept. cited Marisol for violating the Solid Waste Management Act when Marisol mislabeled and
failed to make visible the labels on certain solid waste drums.
Marisol appealed the citation and received a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. Marisol
argued that the labelings constituted minor violations within the meaning of the statute because they were not
purposeful, posed a minimum risk to public health, safety and natural resources, and did not undermine the
regulatory goals. Marisol further argued that because the labelings were minor violations, which may be
corrected within a period of time, the statute prohibited the Dept. from imposing monetary penalties on Marisol.
Marisol, in other words, argued that it was entitled to the statutory Grace Period. Based on trial testimony, the
Dept. argued that the labelings were major violations, not minor, and therefore penalties were proper. The
Administrative Law Judge found that the grace period did not apply and ruled in favor of the Dept., assessing
Marisol a $4,500 penalty for the violations. Marisol appealed the Administrative Law Judge's ruling to the
Dept's Commissioner. The Commissioner affirmed the ruling in favor of the Dept. and Marisol appealed to the
present court.
The New Jersey Superior Court vacated the monetary penalties against Marisol and held that the grace
period applied to Marisol. The court ruled that the Dept's regulatory law was outdated and not based on the
current statute. Accordingly, the court ruled that the Dept failed to provide adequate evidence to show
Marisol's violation was major. Thus, the court ruled that Marisol's violation was minor. As such, the court
ruled that Marisol could not incur a monetary penalty under the grace period statute since Marisol remedied the
labelings within the appropriate time frame.
MARYA KATHRYN LUCAS

Found. for Independent Livinp. Inc. v. The Cabell-Huntington Bd. of Health 2003 WL 22850010 (W.Va. 2003)
On December 12, 2001 the Cabell-Huntington Board of Health adopted the "Cabell County Clean
Indoor Regulation of 2001," which prohibited smoking in all enclosed public areas within Cabell County. Soon
after the Foundation for Independent Living filed suit in the circuit court seeking injunctive relief, declaring the
Board had overstepped its authority, infringed upon the fundamental right to privacy, and that under West
Virginia law bars did not constitute public places. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for
the Foundation. The Supreme Court of Appeals for West Virginia reviewed the case de novo.
The Court held that that the Board had not overstepped its bounds in passing the Clean Indoor
regulation. The Court based its findings on the fact that the state legislature found smoking to cause lung
-
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cancer, heart disease and other serious health problems, that the state's goal was to create a citizenry free from
the use of tobacco, and that the Board was granted authority to promote and maintain clean and safe air, water,
food and facilities. The Court went on to say that, to claim that an office or conference room was truly a private
area created a heavy burden to show that it provided no risk of smoke exposure to the public or to employees,
and constituted no infringement on constitutional privacy. Finally, the Court noted that despite the fact that
West Virginia law designated bars as private clubs, they were still subject to state health and fire codes and as
such were still subject to the Board's mandates. In upholding the county regulation, the Court limited its
applicability to areas that had not already been preempted by state statute.
JAMES C. CHOSTNER
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